

Language: An Overhaul
of Linguistic Philosophy

“Run, Daddy, Run!”

- Lucas Ocean

Table of Contents

Part 0: Preliminaries — in which things begin.

Prologue	i
On the Suitability of Humor in Philosophy	ix
Why Read This Book?	xiii

Part I: Reviving Descriptivism for Names — in which things Kripke’s weak arguments of ignorance and error are shown to have no force while his modal argument is taken to be so powerful that it must be accepted. The result is rigidified descriptivism. The causal theory, meanwhile, is shown to have serious flaws. At its best, every step of it is descriptivist, and, accordingly, it doesn’t count as an alternate theory. At its worst, for species and such, its meanings are completely hidden to us, and we have no idea what we are saying.

1 Defending Descriptivism.....	2
1 Parasitic Reference.....	3
1 Arranging the Arguments	5
2 The Argument of Ignorance	8
3 The Argument of Error	9
4 The Epistemic Argument.....	13
5 The Missing Argument.....	16
6 Conclusion	19
2 Evans and Causing the Information	20
1 Straw Man	20
2 The Problem According to Evans.....	22
3 Evans’ Answer to the Problem.....	23
4 The Flaw in Evans’ Answer	24
3 Conclusion	27
2 The Flaws in the Causal Theory	30
1 The Epistemic Weakness of the Causal Theory for Natural Stuff.....	31
1 What is a Tiger?	32
2 Fool’s Gold	36
2 Up the Biological Staircase	40
1 Donnellan and Putnam.....	41
2 They All Have Scientific Concept Replacement Words	43
3 What to Do with Them?	45
3 The Causal Theory for Names is Descriptivist	48
4 Cumulative Conclusions of the Last Two Chapters	53

Part II: A New Way of Thinking about Language — in which a study of all languages is embarked upon, starting from first principles, and in which the halting and flawed usage of first order logic is dismissed. A sophisticated terminology about language is crafted.

3	Towards an A Priori Discussion of Language	63
1	Kripke and Goldbach	64
2	Hesperus and Phosphorus or Bread Mouse and Cheese Mouse	66
3	‘Stick S is one meter long at t_0 ’ and a Bit More.....	68
4	Our Terms of Art	72
1	Language.....	72
2	The Necessary and the Evident	74
3	A Bit of Practice	75
4	English Style: Words, Localization and Objects	77
5	Words	77
6	Localized Intersection	79
7	Linguistic Objects	79
8	Phase Space and Localized Phase Space	80
9	Objects and Dings.....	81
10	Hook Words	83
11	Definite Descriptions.....	84
12	Rigidified Definite Descriptions	84
13	A Preparatory Remark about Hook Words	85
14	An Interesting Remark about Rigidified Definite Descriptions	86
15	Abbreviated Rigidified Definite Descriptions	89
16	Odds and Ends	90

Part III: Clearing Up Confusions — in which various confusions in linguistic philosophy are explored and resolved with the aid of our new powerful nomenclature. The necessary a posteriori receives some attention, claims of identifying reference are scrutinized, current linguistic jargon is held at arm’s length, the problem of the ring (and of marginal existence) is considered, and Kaplan is embraced.

5	Understanding the Riddle of the Necessary A Posteriori.....	92
1	Controversy	93
2	Teasing apart the Riddle: Evident Sentential Overlays with Evident Context ...	96
3	“Sentences” and the Ensuing Riddle	99
4	Evident Sentential Overlays with Hidden Context.....	100
5	Dthat Does That	102
6	Conclusion	104

6	Identifying Reference and Faux Rigidification	106
1	“Identifying Reference”	106
2	Picking Things Out of a Lineup	110
3	Strawson’s “Identifying Reference” and Dossiers on the World	112
4	Particularity and Recognition	115
5	Low Resolution Vision and Snakes	116
6	Not Linguistic.....	120
7	Rigidification	121
8	The Psychological Response of Faux Rigidification	122
9	The Stock Character.....	123
10	Rigidifying to Hidden Stuff.....	125
7	“Russellianism”	129
1	Russell	129
2	If That Is Russell, What Is Russellianism?.....	131
8	Are You Propositioning Me?	134
1	A Singular Proposition	134
2	It Doesn’t Matter.....	137
3	Enter Salmon	137
4	Salmon’s Palaver about His Propositions	139
5	But I Don’t Want to Talk about Any of This!	142
6	What’s the Point, Then?	143
9	The Problem of the Ring.....	145
1	The Ring.....	145
2	The Earthly Ring.....	148
3	One Gedanken Experiment against Descriptivism for Names	152
4	It Is Confusing.....	156
5	The Problem of the Ring Is Akin to Concept Replacement	158
10	The Marginal Existence of Ned and Jonah.....	159
1	Introduction	159
2	One and Three: Namenfacts and Speaker’s Reference	162
3	Two: Quibbling about the Marginal Existence of Ned and Jonah.....	164
4	Do You Agree Now that It Is a Ring Issue?	169
5	When Both Views Are Right, It Leads to Equivocation	171
11	Kaplan’s Non-descriptive is Our Descriptive.....	175
1	Kaplan Spoils a Party	175
2	Nondescriptive Thoughts.....	181
3	Low Resolution Philosophy.....	184
4	You Like Kaplan, Then?	188
5	Why Did Kaplan Call the Opposing Position “Russellian”?	189

Part IV: Three Horsemen of the Apocalypse — in which three accounts that are supposed to fit hand in glove with austere direct reference and provide it intelligibility and support are criticized.

12	The Mental Lives of Oysters	192
1	Two Notions of Thinking About	192
2	Oysters on the Serengeti	194
3	Thoughts	194
13	“Natural Kinds”	200
1	Subsets of the Natural World	201
2	<i>By</i> the Natural World	201
3	Quine Speaks	204
4	Go Ask the Chemist!	209
14	Social Accounts of Meaning	214
1	A Peculiar Argument	215
2	Oblique Occurrence	216
3	Arthritis and Other Examples	217
4	We Could Attribute It, Nonetheless!	220

Part V: Two-Dimensionalism is a Way of Talking — in which a very short defense of Chalmers is mounted against a very long attack by Soames, the brevity made possible by the fact that Soames seems to be upset Chalmers talks a certain way and thinks he can attack Chalmers’ eventual conclusions by dismissing the way he talks. The short defense is merely the observation that a way of speaking cannot be dismissed on any grounds, whatsoever, and if certain conclusions follow, tough beans!

15	Soames Attacks Chalmers	226
1	Introduction	226
2	Chalmers Speaks	228
3	Soames Attacks Chalmers	230
4	Soames Speaks Differently	234
5	Soames Has a Lot at Stake	234
6	An Example: Rigidification on Bread Mouse and Cheese Mouse	237
7	Two Kinds of Possibility	238
8	Hidden Bimorphic Words vs. Hidden Monomorphic Words	240
9	The Example Soames Uses against Chalmers	243
16	An Appendix	248

Part VI: A Close Look at Names — in which the weakest of names are considered to see what they are doing, the archetypal use of names is considered, various things we might do when names are empty are considered, the difference between semantic and pragmatic assignment is considered, and the positions of various empty names theorists are judged.

17	What Are Names Used For?	257
1	Crosswise Communication	258
2	Mr. Mxyzptlk	259
3	What Gets Communicated?.....	260
4	Quibbling about Existence.....	262
5	Names Peter Out.....	264
6	Have We Abused What Names Are Used For?	266
18	Lost Baptisms and Never Repeated Names	268
1	Introduction	268
2	The Gerbil Problem	269
3	The General Case of Names	272
19	Denying the Laundry Refers.....	275
20	Millian Descriptivism	280
1	The Millian Descriptivists	280
2	Who Is to Be the Master?—That’s All	283
3	A True Story	285
4	Adams’ Position	287
5	Braun’s Account	292
6	I Don’t Feel Well	294
7	Dissolving Pseudo-Problems	296
21	Enough with the Names, Already!	299

Part VII: The Interesting Problem of Hidden Essences — in which the question of who is to be the master is considered (the answer to which makes descriptivism perforce the necessary account of a name and the cognitive purchase upon a word perforce the meaning of any word for the true speaker), Frege’s puzzle is solved, and the back and forth between philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind is mulled over.

22	Frege’s Puzzle	303
23	Shmink and the Epistemology of Rigidification.....	305
1	Rigidification to the Evident	305
2	Contrasted with Rigidification to the Hidden	306
3	Rigidification to the Never Evident	310

24	On Niobium.....	314
1	Moving to Any Old Set, Not an “Object” Set	314
2	The Meaning in My Mind versus the Post-Proposition.....	318
25	Final Thoughts.....	320
1	Word Games and Random Thoughts	320
2	The Master Argument	324
3	Back to Burge and Putnam	329
4	Goodbye.....	330
	References	333



Prologue



A few years ago, I started to play with maps from possible worlds to sets of possible worlds. I liked the simplicity. I called the first the sentence and the second the meaning, and I was able to say a sentence is true if it is a member of its meaning. I was also able to map points to singletons containing them, and I rather liked that. Every sentence was true in such a language. The function was injective. No world expressed the same sentence. I could build a lot of languages, as I called these functions, where every sentence is true and a lot of languages where every sentence is false. The multiplicity was interesting.

Yet the desire to have a sentence expressed in more than one possible world kept coming back to me. I bundled them together into fibers. But it didn't make me happy. I made various sets in various ways, but it got so complicated I thought the whole thing would become simpler if I just plopped down sets of possible worlds on the domain side to begin with. I had fallen in love with the notion that, with respect to a language, some possible worlds would be eternally true and others eternally false, but I had to admit an appealing symmetry arises when the domain and the range are the very same set.

I continued, and when people asked me what I was doing, I would tell them I was studying languages. People at parties would be intrigued, and they would ask me about French, Sanskrit, Portuguese or whatever language they had studied or thought exotic and interesting. I responded that I was mapping green triangles into yellow squares. They took a sip. I said it was really interesting when you map a green triangle into a green triangle! They shifted, uncomfortably. Did you know, I said, that you can name a sentence with something utterly unlike the sentence itself and then use a truth operator to get to its meaning? You could view them as part of the same fiber, naturally,



On the Suitability of Humor in Philosophy



One final thing. I am always astonished how illogical people can be when they talk philosophy. I am astonished, likewise, how brilliant people think they are. These are people who could study as hard as they might for the rest of their lives and still not pass Artin's algebra. Most philosophical writing flows from individuals who are illogical and who are confident they are quite smart. My friend, Miki, is smart. Abhinav is smart. Gerald Sacks is smart. Why do I get so terribly annoyed when people think they are smart? Perhaps it is because I know I am nowhere near as smart as these three. I have recalibrated smartness in my head, and I no longer consider myself smart. It is what happens to you—or should happen to you—if you go to M. I. T. I am a journeyman, and if I could know what Gerald Sacks knows for one minute, it would be an extraordinary minute!

So, when an author is illogical in philosophy (and thinks a great deal of himself), I sharpen my pen, and I point out what is illogical. Yet, if I were to stop there, philosophy would go on as before, endlessly metastasizing and propagating its illogic to the next less-than-smart generation. To stop this, I take the next obvious step. I try to make the reader laugh. A belly laugh is what really puts an end to an incorrect philosopher's pretensions.

Accordingly, there is a lot of humor to be found in the work that follows. Philosophy ain't beanbag. The whole point of the discipline is to lay claim to absolute and perfect truth. There is no easy let down for failure, and nobody should demand to be treated with kid gloves. I don't know what a kid glove is, but you should expect people to laugh at you when you are wrong. Lakatos said to Feyerabend once, "Paul, you have such strange ideas. Why don't you write them down? I shall write a reply, ... and ... we shall have lots of fun."²

² Feyerabend 1988, p. vii.



Why Read This Book?



In the coming book, I will offer an overhaul of linguistic philosophy. The subject took a tremendous turn in nineteen seventy when Kripke gave us the lectures of *Naming and Necessity*, and it is time to turn the ship around again. We are not going to head off in the old direction. Back in the day, we couldn't even talk about possible worlds. Quine didn't much care for them. It took the stubbornness of Carnap to demand intensions take their place at the forefront of meaning and extensions—what happens to be a whale in the actual world—be relegated to a secondary role. His student, Kaplan, took up the challenge and surpassed his teacher. California semantics, as Putnam called it (while he disparaged it), is a great achievement and is not going away. Yet the project was diverted, distracted and upended by rigidification just as it got going.

The masters of possible worlds, Kripke and Kaplan, felt a disturbance in the force. They were upset by an oddity, and they focused their attention glaringly upon it. Kripke declared names are rigid designators and their counterfactual truth conditions depend upon that very object existing (and doing whatever the sentence requires) in those possible worlds. Pre-possible worlds philosophers, such as Russell, had suggested names were abbreviated descriptions. After all, the name 'Romulus', said Russell, was a perfectly good name if someone suckled from a wolf, killed his brother and founded Rome, but it would have to be a disguised description if such things turn out to have been a myth. Thus thought Russell.

Kripke came down hard on Russell insofar as one views a description as selecting a different object in different possible worlds. The counterfactual behavior of a descriptive phrase is completely unlike the counterfactual behavior of a name! Thus thought Kripke. It came out as a harsh attack on Russell, which—if you think about it—was a bit unfair to a ninety-seven year old man who was raised by idealists at Cambridge and who would die in a few days' time.

Part I

Reviving Descriptivism for Names

in which Kripke's weak arguments of ignorance and error are shown to have no force while his modal argument is taken to be so powerful it must be accepted. The result is rigidified descriptivism. The causal theory, meanwhile, is shown to have serious flaws. At its best, every step of it is descriptivist, and, accordingly, it doesn't count as an alternate theory. At its worst, for species and such, its meanings are completely hidden to us, and we have no idea what we are saying.



1. Defending Descriptivism

THE FLAWS IN THE ATTACK ON DESCRIPTIVISM AND THE VALUE OF SEARLE'S NOTION OF PARASITIC REFERENCE



In this chapter, I will look at the most important attacks that were offered against descriptivism, and I will defend descriptivism against these attacks. In the first section, three arguments will be taken together. They are the argument of ignorance, the argument of error, and the epistemic argument, and they all stem directly from Kripke's exposition in *Naming and Necessity*. They are to be taken together because the answer to each involves the same notion: parasitic reference, as explicated by Searle.¹⁰ These arguments will be presented, their interrelationships will be observed, and their force will be blunted by attending to Searle's basic message, which is that we need to understand and to acknowledge the presence of *all* descriptive facts about the referent, and included among these facts is the fact the object has been previously named by others.

In the second section, I will examine an argument made by Evans against the descriptive theory.¹¹ I will first criticize Evans' explication of the ranking scheme envisioned by Kripke for the descriptivist proposal. Evans' voting scheme to assign reference is *not* the one Kripke depicts, and it is not relevant to descriptivism, I will argue. I will examine Evans' claim that descriptivism will take us away from the intuitive referent and, working within the proper voting and ranking scheme, I will show it is not the case. Instead, it will be clear Evans is biasing his example by failing to consider various descriptions of

¹⁰ See Searle 1983.

¹¹ See Evans 1973.



2. The Flaws in the Causal Theory

AND WHY IT DOES NOT REALLY SUPPLANT DESCRIPTIVISM



In this chapter, I will first examine various epistemic flaws in the causal theory. In particular, Kripke's extension of his naming theory to species terms and mass terms brings up serious epistemic issues. After all, one really would like to know something about tigers, don't you think? After exploring these problems, I will show, by considering the essays of Donnellan, Putnam and Kripke, that all these authors are using words whose source and origin of meaning is scientific concept replacement, a competing approach to giving these sorts of words a meaning, which allows the speaker to know something about tigers.³¹ Hence, in the first section, I will point out severe problems with the causal theory and note the virtues of its rival.

In the second section, a more important result is obtained after the causal theory is given some meat and some detail, which its advocates have been remiss in not providing. I shall simply ask: in virtue of *what* does a baptism succeed and in virtue of *what* is a link in the causal chain extended? It will be quite easily seen the only plausible account of success is one that postulates a description in the mind of a speaker as a necessary and sufficient condition for success. Therefore, it follows that, once we retreat from the vague generality of a causal theory in the abstract to a specific version with real details, the causal theory can be completely subsumed under the mantle of descriptivism. One might call it a causal theory, I suppose, but every answer it gives would be given, too, by the descriptive theory applied to a speaker within the chain.

In the third section, I will draw various interpretive strands together. There are problems with the causal theory. Its competition, which lacks these

³¹ See Donnellan 1962, Putnam 1962 and Kripke 1980.

Part II

A New Way of Thinking about Language

in which a study of all languages is embarked upon, starting from first principles, and in which the halting and flawed usage of first order logic is dismissed. A sophisticated terminology about language is crafted.



3. Towards an A Priori Discussion of Language



I think we have arrived at an important result in linguistic philosophy. To arrive at further results, I think it is crucial to add rigor to our discussion. Riddles in linguistic philosophy stem, as far as I can tell, from inattention to detail and from merging and manipulating hazy ideas. In the next chapter, I introduce a new way of speaking about language. It is hoped the terminology is sufficiently general so anyone carrying on a conversation in this intellectual neck of the woods will be able to see that what *they* are talking about is a narrow type or a not so difficult arrangement of the notions I am talking about. My notions, therefore, need to be pure, unadulterated and elegant. They need to be able to serve as a basis—as building blocks—for the notions others might be thinking.

In the previous chapters, I got away with talking about sentences, objects, meanings, descriptions, rigidification and the like without being so very precise. However, as we go deeper into these issues, it is the lack of precision by people who use these words, and the inevitable equivocations and confusions that ensue, which make our various riddles arise in the first place. Therefore, I am of the opinion there is very little point in discussing these other worries in linguistic philosophy without first creating a very clear template of elegant notions. The discussions of others can be pressed upon the template, and the rigidity of the basis should clarify the discussion, purge equivocation, dissolve confusion, etcetera.

It is a great deal of work to comprehend the compendium of notions which I shall codify and label for their easy use in linguistic discussions. I think it is entirely worth the effort, but I should hope to persuade the reader of this perspective in advance. Unfortunately, I do not think there is any way to do



4. Our Terms of Art

*A LINGUISTIC META-LANGUAGE THAT CAN HELP US
UNDERSTAND VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND DISSOLVE VARIOUS
CONFUSIONS*



1. Language

Write the set of all possible worlds as Ω . The *power set* of Ω is the set of all possible subsets of Ω and is written $\wp(\Omega)$.

A *language* is a partial function from the power set of Ω to itself. Hence, it is a map from one subset of possible worlds to another subset of possible worlds. It is a map from one way the world can be to another.

$$L : \wp(\Omega) \rightarrow \wp(\Omega)$$

$$A \mapsto B$$

A language L consists of ordered pairs, $\langle A, B \rangle \in \wp(\Omega) \times \wp(\Omega)$, to be called *sentence pairs*. The first element is the *sentence*, and the second element is the *meaning* of the sentence. The meaning of A is the image of A under the language map L and is written: $L(A)$. Above, $B = L(A)$. The actual world is written as $w_\alpha \in \Omega$. A sentence A is *true* when $w_\alpha \in L(A)$, and *false* otherwise. Additionally, a sentence A is *true at w* if $w \in L(A)$ and *false at w* if $w \notin L(A)$.

A sentence A is *present* if $w_\alpha \in A$.

A sentence A is *present at w* if $w \in A$.

A sentence A is *necessary* if $L(A) = \Omega$.

A sentence A is *contradictory* (or *necessarily false*) if $L(A) = \emptyset$.

A sentence A is *contingent* if it is neither necessary nor contradictory.

Part III

Clearing Up Confusions

in which various confusions in linguistic philosophy are explored and resolved with the aid of our new powerful nomenclature. The necessary a posteriori receives some attention, claims of identifying reference are scrutinized, current linguistic jargon is held at arm's length, the problem of the ring (and of marginal existence) is considered, and Kaplan is embraced.



5. Understanding the Riddle of the Necessary A Posteriori



In this chapter, I will introduce a type of sentence that Kripke examined in *Naming and Necessity*, which are commonly called necessary a posteriori sentences. I will explore the controversy that ensued immediately, in which various authors claimed these propositions should *not* be called necessary a posteriori sentences. Call them what you will, however, we do appear to have sentences of the type, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', and the evaluation of these sentences does require a posteriori investigation. So, we have an oddity insofar as, historically, experience and experiment were not thought relevant to assess necessary truths.

In fact, precisely on this account, Quine considered this very sentence not to be necessary. It took a great insight by Kripke to see that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is necessarily true, if it is true at all. Quine had stated otherwise. Much earlier, in 1943, Quine grappled with these issues, and he came to a different conclusion. Quine wrote:

On the other hand the statements:

- (23) The number of planets is necessarily greater than 7,
- (24) Necessarily, if there is life on the Evening Star then there is life on the Morning Star

are false, since the statements:

The number of planets is greater than 7,
If there is life on the Evening Star, then there is life on the Morning Star

are true only because of circumstances outside logic.⁵³

⁵³ Quine 1943, p. 121.



6. Identifying Reference and Faux Rigidification

*RE-IDENTIFYING OR IDENTIFYING? ESSENCE OR LAUNDRY?
IMAGINARY FRIENDS? THE CURIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT
IDENTIFYING REFERENCE.*



1. “Identifying Reference”

In this chapter, I will examine a discussion that, for some authors, takes on philosophical and linguistic importance. I argue, quite to the contrary, that not much of importance is going on. It is not to be argued that nothing is going on. For instance, Donnellan has some distinction in mind when he proclaims a difference between his referential use of a definite description and his attributive use of a definite description.⁶⁴ He says the difference is not to be found in the sentence itself. He says it is to be found in the way the sentence is used. Kripke feels he understands Donnellan’s difference. Kripke thinks it is just the fact that the speaker has a particular object in mind in one case, which he does not have in another.⁶⁵ Kripke thinks this is not a linguistic matter, and he is a bit confused why Donnellan is going on and on. I agree with Kripke on this point. After all, Donnellan says the difference is found in the way a sentence is *used*. But you can use a sentence to do a zillion different things. Not all the distinctions are linguistic.

My issue in the current chapter has to do with a recurring phrase in linguistic philosophy: identifying reference. For instance, when Kripke talks about speaker’s reference, he takes as a given that the speaker has some object

⁶⁴ See Donnellan 1966.

⁶⁵ See Kripke 1977.

-----•-----

7. “Russellianism”

-----•-----

1. Russell

It might be instructive to examine a bit of jargon that arose in the last fifty years. One school of thought on the matter of names has come to be called Russellianism or neo-Russellianism. It is the view that ordinary proper names, such as ‘Mildred Owens’ and ‘Richard Feynman’ have no linguistic intermediary other than their referent, the object for which they stand. Fregeanism, meanwhile, is jargon for the view that some sort of descriptive intermediary, some sort of Sinn, intervenes and gets us to the referent somehow.

The first jargon is interesting because, if you know Russell’s line of thought, you are aware he did *not* think an ordinary name such as ‘Mildred Owens’ was unmediated by descriptive lore. Quite to the contrary, he thought a person who utilized such a name must have in mind some description, e.g, the frumpy housewife of 136 Abercrombie Lane, Glasgow, Scotland, or the wife of the minister of education for the Glasgow municipal government, or the woman concerning whom my interlocutor has a unique description under the name, ‘Mildred Owens’, and suchlike. It is illustrative to inquire how it came about a position Russell would find anathema to his own came to be named after him.

It is peculiar. Russell thought ordinary English names were disguised descriptors. When you spoke of Romulus, he said, you were describing a character in the past, and it would be fine if you were wrong about its existence. You would still be saying something and meaning something.

Russell also had a technical device within his adaptation of Frege’s first order logic, the 0-ary functions, which, in moments of laziness, he liked to call names.

-----•-----

8. Are You Propositioning Me?

-----•-----

Was that a proposition? It makes no sense, ever, to quibble about a word. One of the strangest events in linguistic philosophy transpired when various philosophers got together to call something a proposition, a thing that possesses no conceivable intrinsic interest—at least as far as I can see.

Is it permissible? Well, of course, it is. Knock yourself out. If you find yourself twisted into spectacular ambages and you enjoy that sort of thing, keep talking as you are inclined to. I will talk another way. I will talk like Stalnaker.

It doesn't matter who talks what way. Just choose a way of talking and get on with it. I can follow. I can follow what you are saying, if you have anything to say.

It is entirely amusing that people think they are telling me something new and interesting when they are only telling me how they are about to talk. And I shall tell you how I shall talk. Are we going to talk about anything, or was that it?

1. A Singular Proposition

A term of art for certain philosophers is the jargon, *singular proposition*. In the hands of Kaplan, it becomes the sort of proposition that arises after Dthat has been employed. If I say:

- (1) Dthat (the inventor of the zip) is overweight.

it represents a singular proposition, unlike the proposition represented by:

- (2) The inventor of the zip is overweight.

The possible worlds where (1) is true differ from the possible worlds where (2)



9. The Problem of the Ring



1. The Ring

When defining a name as a rigidification of descriptive comments in a dossier, we divided the dossier into the core and the periphery. The meaning of the name is thought of as the rigidification of the conjunction of the core descriptions when there is just a core and a periphery. The language in which these descriptions are expressed does not have to be the language wherein the name resides, and this feature allows us to put any coherent thought at all into the description.

We defined the core, the periphery and the ring in terms of the notion of dissolving the dossier. Since the dossier embodies a thinker's opinion that such-and-such an object with the attached name is an object that exists in the world, we consider the prospect of our thinker coming to believe that the conjunction of all the facts in the dossier does *not* describe a thing in the world.

The next question is what to do about it. The dossier needs to be broken up, obviously. It is less than obvious that it needs to be dissolved. But what are we saying? If we consider the dossier to be the conjunction of all these facts, it surely needs to be dissolved.

Perhaps we should be pure and dissolve the dossier whenever the conjunction of facts once believed true as an ensemble are no longer believed true as an ensemble.

There is a clear sense, when we take all the elements in the dossier to define the dossier, in which there is no such thing as modifying a dossier which is believed to refer to nothing. There is only dissolution. Hence, even by *using* the phrase “modifying a dossier,” instead of always dissolving it, we are implying some sort of equivalence class. We have a pre-existing equivalence class of sets of conjoined descriptions, then. We must ask ourselves if it is an arbitrary equivalence class—solely of emotional value—or if the equivalence class is the reflection of something interesting and deep about the world.



10. The Marginal Existence of Ned and Jonah

AN APPLICATION OF THE RING



1. Introduction

Now that we have the concept of the ring more firmly in hand, we can address a third discussion found in *Naming and Necessity* and elsewhere in Kripke's writings. One might consider the argument of ignorance to have two flavors. In the first, the claim is made that the speaker has a fact or two in her dossier but their descriptive force is so weak they do not come close to selecting anything uniquely. A physicist or something. There are a lot of physicists. An NBA basketball player or something. There are a lot of NBA basketball players. The purported riddle is to wonder how a girl can refer to Kentavious Caldwell-Pope when she says, "Kentavious Caldwell-Pope is supposed to arrive," when all she can tell you about him is that he is an NBA basketball player or something. In the second flavor, there is instead an extensive dossier, and we presume the conjunction refers to nothing and, moreover, that no subset of the conjunction refers to anything, as well. The problem could also be viewed a second flavor of error, I suppose, with the error being that the descriptive theory should say there is nothing being referred to while Kripke maintains there is.

Anyway, there *is* a third argument that Kripke is using, and its solution is much different than in the case of the other two. Devitt, as a Kripkean apologist, stated the only real alternative open to an advocate for the descriptive theory of names was to bite the bullet and to claim Oppenheimer and Schmidt are being referred to, not Einstein and Gödel. Devitt said we could deny the claimed linguistic fact that 'Albert Einstein' and 'Kurt

11. Kaplan's Non-descriptive Is Our Descriptive

1. Kaplan Spoils a Party

There are various confusions in linguistic philosophy, some of which are merely terminological. When you are reading Kaplan's festschrift, *An Idea of Donnellan*, found in a collection of essays celebrating Donnellan, it is easy to get lost as to which side of the fence he is on. Kaplan speaks of singular thoughts and nondescriptive thoughts. The first phrase is the calling card of the austere direct reference theorist. The second phrase, too, sounds as if it would be employed against descriptivism for names. However, things are not what they seem.

Kaplan is using the word, *singular*, merely to signify the truth conditions of the thought. He uses it to signify rigidity. If he were using it to talk about a descriptive thought, such as the kind often proposed by Donnellan in his examples, he would be applying to it his Dthat operator. A singular thought, for Kaplan, has rigid counterfactual truth conditions.

Kaplan explicitly states he is going his own way with his nomenclature:

A drawback to my nomenclature is that the term *singular thought* misleadingly suggests that such a thought amounts to nothing more than our entertaining a Russellian singular proposition, a proposition containing an individual. This is exactly what Russell believed and may be what Donnellan believes, but it isn't what I believe, so please don't read it that way. (I don't believe that thoughts are Russellian propositions.)¹¹³

Kaplan is "concerned with the sort of meaning that we grasp"¹¹⁴ and the sort

¹¹³ Kaplan 2012, p. 127.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 128.

Part IV

Three Horsemen of the Apocalypse

in which three accounts that are supposed to fit hand in glove with austere direct reference and provide it intelligibility and support are criticized.



12. The Mental Lives of Oysters



1. Two Notions of Thinking About

External thoughts do not deliver as much as is promised. Some philosophers would like to talk about this sort of thing, and others do not. On the one hand, we have Stalnaker musing about something he calls *wide content*, and, on the other hand, we have Loar musing about *narrow content*. Stalnaker, in *Narrow Content* (1990), has a project where he explicates *thinking about* in external terms. It is fine with me. Coin yourself some jargon and get on with it. I would be the last to oppose such a project.

However, it simply doesn't describe what I wish to talk about. It doesn't delineate the germ that is philosophically interesting. It delineates *something*, of course. One cannot fail to delineate something. And there is no harm in it. There is nothing at all wrong with Stalnaker's project. He has a notion, and here it is. However, we are about to embark upon an exploration, and the goal of our exploration is to reveal there is some other fascinating sense in which one's thoughts are about something.

Stalnaker has a project of describing thoughts in terms of causation emanating from the environment. He is working on a causal-information theoretic strategy (CITS) for meaning. It "will explain content in terms of counterfactual dependencies that tend to hold, under normal conditions, between thinker's internal states and their environments."¹²⁸

The ambitious aspects of the construct are, however, that it is rather tricky to define normality and it is also somewhat tricky to define the relevant environmental states without recourse to natural kinds—which has a host of problems associated with it. Yet, if anybody can do counterfactuals, Stalnaker can. (No pun, intended.)

¹²⁸ Stalnaker 1999, p. 204.



13. “Natural Kinds”



The title is wrapped in scare quotes because somebody started calling something “natural kinds” fifty years ago, and it is not obvious just what we philosophers are calling natural kinds today, and still less obvious that these sorts of things—whatever they are—exist. Our goal is not to refute all the accumulated ruminations in favor of natural kinds that have accreted into philosophy over the years.

Instead, it is relevant to our linguistic discussion that philosophers grappling with the issue of direct reference come to the table with their minds already made up about three important issues: natural kinds, social meaning, and wide content. Natural kinds provide a linguistic *deus ex machina* that—bling!—allows various words to be about something and to circumscribe a set of entities after ostensive hand waving. It is a neat trick. It is one thing to wave your hands toward an object and have your linguistic meaning get tangled up with the object’s essence. It is another thing to wave your hand toward an object and have the linguistic meaning of a word absorb a *set* to which the object belongs. As if that is unique! It is pretty crazy, if you think about it. But, if you don’t think about it—well, you get the natural kinds linguistic position.

Regrettably, it infects Kripke’s view. I was trying to help Kripke earlier by assuming for the sake of argument that a species is defined by a capacity to interbreed. So, once a tiger is crossed with a lion, our word ‘tiger’ has been about a lion all this time! But not every creature is sexual. And I *proposed* the notion of interbreeding.¹³⁰ You would have to do so, too. You would really have to say from the outset that it is part of your linguistic proposal that all

¹³⁰ Moreover, the interbreeding relation obviously does not define an equivalence class.

-----•-----

14. Social Accounts of Meaning

-----•-----

Kripke relies heavily on natural kinds for his linguistic account. That they make no sense is problematic for his account. Two other issues are thought to go hand in glove with austere direct reference, a wide take on content and a social account of meaning. Social accounts of meaning are similar to causal theories of meaning. Putnam, in *Meaning and Reference*, seems to invoke both natural kinds and a social account. I cannot tell which is primary. Is it the absurd claim there is just one unique volume of localized phase space, *same_L*, and it determines Oscar's meaning for water? Or is it the claim there are various metallurgists in society who are thinking about a particular atomic number and thusly bestowing meaning on Oscar's utterance of molybdenum? I cannot say. It would be peculiar if neither aspect were primary. Which is to say it would be peculiar if one of these aspects weren't irrelevant and superfluous. Yet I do not know which one Putnam values more.

Turning earnestly to the social thesis, now, the basic idea is someone else's thoughts are determining what *you* are thinking. It does not sound very promising. Prima facie, it sounds as though the fact a person in Tibet is thinking about a truck is what makes me think about conga dancing (quite unbeknownst to me!) whilst I am contemplating a lobster. Different details, perhaps, but the same idea. Just plug in different values, and you will get their view. I am not going to sign on to this right away. But the position was popular—indeed it was dominant—in the 1970's and 1980's. It is worthwhile, therefore, to go back to the persuasive essays of the time period in order to see what notions were being bandied about.

We revisit a classic work that drove the debate over to the social side when it was received in 1979. Burge's *Individualism and the Mental* purported to give us a knockdown argument that meanings were not in the head. The characters in his gedanken experiments do not correctly or fully understand

Part V

Two-Dimensionalism is a Way of Talking

in which a very short defense of Chalmers is mounted against a very long attack by Soames, the brevity made possible by the fact that Soames seems to be upset Chalmers talks a certain way and thinks he can attack Chalmers' eventual conclusions by dismissing the way he talks. The short defense is merely the observation that a way of speaking cannot be dismissed on any grounds, whatsoever, and if certain conclusions follow, tough beans!

-----•-----

15. Soames Attacks Chalmers

BUT A DEFINITION IS NOT A “TENET”

-----•-----

1. Introduction.

The interesting thing about an a priori approach to language is that it cannot be attacked. If I choose to use these symbols to talk about various things, there is nothing you can do to stop me. Sets of possible worlds are related in certain ways. It is rather interesting. Do you have a problem with it? There are languages. There are linguistic objects of any kind you might wish to imagine. One can use a description to fix a reference to a linguistic object. There are sentences whose sentence side you are aware of. There are sentences whose sentence side you are not. There are collections of sentences. There are sentential overlays with hidden context. Some of them are automatically true. Some of them are automatically false. There are monomorphic words in some languages. Using linguistic objects (of whatever sort you might like to agree on), you can use a description to fix upon a monomorphic word. It can be evident, or it can be hidden.

It is all quite simple. If you start from scratch, everything is easy. Kripke didn't start from scratch, but he did say you could use a description to *fix* a referent, and, once you did, it would be true automatically that the stick in Paris was at such-and-such a time one meter long. You would have a sententially overlay that was necessarily-true. It would be an evident sentential overlay with hidden context because the black and white marks would be shimmering and evident in your mind, and the length of the stick in Paris at some precise moment long ago—well, that would be rather hidden, wouldn't it?

It would be a contingent sentence, though. Kripke saw that clearly. He saw, also, that identity between names would be necessary—if you thought of a name as fixing a referent. He saw it quite clearly. We can talk about this stuff all day long. If you talk about it forever and a day, you will see the most



16. An Appendix

*SO YOU CAN SEE QUITE PRECISELY WHAT SOAMES SAYS
AND HOW IT IS DEFINITIONS THAT HE IS PRESENTING*



Here are the tenets Soames gives us as the essence of the position of Chalmers. The reader is invited to see the entire ensemble is a series of definitions. Firstly, I include a boiled down version. It consists of all that is relevant. The reader should notice each remark is a definition. It follows that this part cannot be attacked. The only notions that can be attacked are the bits and pieces Soames throws in superfluously.

Secondly, I give the tenets, verbatim, which Soames offers up as the position of Chalmers. The reader is invited to scrutinize the difference between the two versions. Careful study should reveal what is extra in Soames' version (and what I have stripped away) is never used and is not relevant in explicating Kripke's examples—the examples he calls necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori. Accordingly, we are only using a series of definitions to obtain the deflationary result that the view held by Soames and others concerning the necessary a posteriori is a linguistic illusion.

It is helpful to leave all these extra pieces out! I hope the reader notices tenets T5a and T5b are largely eviscerated by this maneuver. They contain a good deal that is irrelevant. I do not care how various people analyze various knowledge and belief attribution statements that involve various modal operators. And, if the reader were to read closely the entirety of chapter 10, she would notice it is *these* analyses, attributed to the strong two-dimensionalists, that are under attack as contrary to linguistic facts. The extra views packed into T5a and T5b lead Soames to declare there is a “confrontation of the central tenets of strong two-dimensionalism with

Part V

A Close Look at Names

in which the weakest of names are considered to see what they are doing, the archetypal use of names is considered, various things we might do when names are empty are considered the difference between semantic and pragmatic assignment is considered, and the positions of various empty names theorists are judged.

17. What Are Names Used For?

Earlier, we defined a name to be the rigidification of a conjunction of descriptions in a dossier. In this chapter, we try to get at what names are used for, and we discover that what they are used for does not align perfectly with what we defined them to be. It is an oddity. In this chapter, I shall investigate names in the old fashioned way. I shall imagine actually using names in various ways. I shall contemplate what needs to be in place between two speakers for communication with names to, in fact, succeed. I shall see if people, under certain circumstances, ever change the core of a name—which runs a bit afoul of the definition. I shall imagine natural cases where people are denying the existence of the object described in the dossier. I shall look at names of people as they expire. Not the people, who are long dead in the examples I imagine, but as the *names* expire—as nobody any longer has any interesting description associated with the names.

The investigation of names is old school. I am introspecting about the typical ways in which I would use the things I call names. Not to keep the reader in suspense, the result is that the communication of the semantic value of a name is *not* what names are used for. Associated with the object named is a lot of laundry, a lot of non-essential characteristics of the object. The practical language function of a name is to communicate and to highlight relationships among the laundry.

The semantic value of a name, meanwhile, is the ding set into which all the essential characteristics are wrapped up, and it is not communicated. It is a good thing because these ding sets are hardly ever known.

Names are linguistic tools that allow us to hang the laundry.



18. Lost Baptisms and Never Repeated Names



1. Introduction

Going back to chapter two, you might recall a host of problems beset our species and mass terms because the baptisms were lost. You might have gotten the impression these problems only weigh down these sorts of terms, but they can weigh down ordinary names, too. We now look at what would happen if perfectly ordinary names were to have their baptisms lost. The result is unsettling.

We will also look closely at what follows from our observation that the basis of crosswise communication—knowing that the person you are talking to calls the object ‘NN’—is both necessary and sufficient for successful communication with names. Recall that whether you yourself call the object ‘NN’, too, is utterly irrelevant! We had an example where George Bush was talking to Dick Cheney and each used a different name for the same object. Communication worked because a crosswise supposition was in place. Next, even if the names happen to be the same (e.g. ‘Madonna’), we saw the reason the communication works is that a crosswise supposition is in place. The utility of name usage depends only the crosswise supposition, and the names do not have to be the same.

Therefore, the obvious next step is to imagine the device of names in place—held together by any number of mutual crosswise suppositions—without the names being the same. This *is* the essence of the naming institution. Why? Because crosswise suppositions are the necessary and sufficient condition for successful name use.

Naturally, some people *might* use the same name as other people do for the same object. A few identities could be scattered amongst the crosswise



19. Denying the Laundry Refers



At some point in your life, you might wish to deny your laundry refers. You might have a dossier, and in the dossier you have a lot of facts. Your ring has gotten thin, and you come to believe the world is so comported and in such-and-such a way that the core of your dossier is not satisfied by anything in the world. What should you do?

Well, you are liable to break down in tears if you come to think you are not going to get any presents on Christmas. I am not saying you should break down in tears. I am not saying you shouldn't. My real question is not, "What should you do?" It is: what should you say in order to mean that you have decided to move certain elements in or out of the ring and that your newly decided firm core of a certain name is, as you understand the world, not satisfied by any object?

Well, those very words will do nicely. But they *are* rather cumbersome. What should you say, instead? What can you say? What could you say that could possibly mean this?

If you have understood the definition of a language, you see it is a trick question. The answer is obvious. You can say anything you like. You can say:

(1) Smipple do-gud fipple jum-jum

and make it mean whatever you like. Each assignment pushes you into a different language. So, you see, it is a rather silly question.

Yet, as a matter of personal curiosity, you might wish to look inside your mind. You might wish to reflect upon the fact that, at some point in your life, you did encounter this very problem, and you did say a few words which meant (to you, anyway, and very likely to your interlocutor) precisely what I spelled out above. Think back, now. What did you say? It is unlikely you went on a metalinguistic tirade.

20. Millian Descriptivism

1. The Millian Descriptivists

There are an infinite number of languages. Adams and Dietrich have declared that certain people are speaking a certain language.¹⁸⁰ Taylor agrees with them.¹⁸¹ Braun says that certain people are speaking a certain other language.¹⁸² Their basic theses are not hard to master. We just now considered an ambiguous language, ambiguous with respect to name denial and name existence sentences. Adams takes us back to the language we started with, before we started getting fancy and creative. He is considering a non-ambiguous language where the partial sentential overlay is null and devoid of sentences when there is no object to satisfy the description in the person's lore or dossier on the name. In these cases, the sentential overlay is meaningless.

Taylor imagines the same language. They diverge over a technicality to be explored later. Millian descriptivists, as we pointed out earlier, have associated with each name a set of descriptions (which these authors call the *lore*). Their names are rigid. Taylor actually borrows REF from Recanati, who borrowed Dthat from Kaplan. Taylor applies REF in order to obtain rigidity.

Obviously, I am happy to have the Millian descriptivists around! They are already on board with the observation that each name has an associated definite description. I don't have to persuade them there are not a lot of famous physicists named 'Richard Feynman' and not a lot of NBA basketball

¹⁸⁰ See Adams and Dietrich 2004.

¹⁸¹ See Taylor 2000.

¹⁸² See Braun 2005.



21. Enough with the Names, Already!



What is the big deal about names? Why are we exploring them in every conceivable detail? Isn't there something else to talk about? We find ourselves talking about names because the general problem we are investigating is the problem of sentences a portion of which is unknown. English has done a pretty good job of purging itself of these sorts of sentences. I heard of a language called Quissel, whose speakers inhabited the Faroe Islands and the Isle of Harris, where ordering a cup of tea involved not just sequencing sounds from one's lips but a precise arrangement of rocks under the North Sea in the Dogger Hills and a hexagonal structure amongst various flocks of llamas in the Andes. These industrious people moved the rocks into the appropriate places twenty fathoms deep in bitterly cold water in hopes of being able to order tea but, in the end, were always frustrated by the unknown contingencies of llamas.

They were happily invaded by the English who could order tea in an obvious way. In English, you see, very little is present—on the sentence side—that is not clearly known, up to any level of epistemic certainty you could possibly desire. On the meaning side, meanwhile, the English are allowed to talk about whatsoever they wish. There are no restrictions, really. The logical positivists postulated radical restrictions, but nobody seems to pay attention to them anymore—and they were mostly Germans. One of the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Great War is that the English people can talk about whatever they like.

Hence, English is a radically asymmetric language, epistemologically. It tends toward putting colors and sounds together to make sentences on this side of the veil of perception and towards speaking about hidden things on the other side. I scarcely know a fraction of the truth values of the meanings that can get constructed in English. However, there are scarcely any sentences where I don't know the sentence I am saying, which is a great improvement over the poor people of Faroe and Harris.

Part VI

The Interesting Problem of Hidden Essences

in which the question of who is to be the master is considered (the answer to which makes descriptivism perform the necessary account of a name and the cognitive purchase upon a word perform the meaning of any word for the true speaker), Frege's puzzle is solved, and the back and forth between philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind is mulled over.



22. Frege's Puzzle



(With descriptivism, the solution is trivial. The austere direct referentialists are still struggling with it.)

How can a statement about the identity of co-referring names be informative? The austere direct referentialist is in a quandary. To him, names have no linguistic component other than their referent. The meaning is just the referent. To say of a certain referent that it is itself provides no information. Soames says it is a difficult problem. In his final reflections in *Reference and Description*, he gives us the briefest of sketches (over the space of four pages) of the four approaches he feels are the most promising for a Millian nondescriptivist to take.¹⁹⁴ At the end of these admittedly superficial treatments, he writes:

This completes my brief survey of attempts to solve Frege's puzzle in frameworks that assign nondescriptive context and characters to proper names (and natural kind terms). Although I haven't been able to present any of these attempts in detail, there is, I think, reason for optimism that a semantically nondescriptive solution incorporating elements of these approaches will be found. If this is right, then the puzzle need not be seen as posing an insurmountable obstacle to nondescriptive analyses of names and natural kind terms.¹⁹⁵

He doesn't have the answer yet, but he has an optimistic feeling it is going to get solved really soon.

So, let's solve the problem, according to descriptivist resources. When you rigidify a description with Dthat, there is a pre-proposition and a post-

¹⁹⁴ See Soames 2005, p. 346-9.

¹⁹⁵ Soames 2005, p. 349.

-----•-----

23. Shmink and the Epistemology of Rigidification

-----•-----

1. Rigidification to the Evident

One of the most fascinating things about rigidification in language is the post-proposition is unknown, the meaning is unknown, and people who talk the language are utterly unconcerned about this fact. People are content with the sentential meaning. People are content with being aware that the counterfactual behavior is indeed different from the non-rigidified case. Keeping track of these things, which are indeed informative and interesting, is quite sufficient for most people. Hence, most people don't bother with the fact that the meanings of their sentences are unknown to them because their sentences are unknown. They wouldn't even understand what you are saying if you pointed it out.

Yet, we are at a point now where we can understand the process of rigidification in these terms. To understand the epistemology, it is best to consider rigidification acting on cases nobody ever thinks of. Rigidification normally maps to things that are hidden and to things that are always hidden. I believe it is why the hidden nature gets lost. To recover the proper perspective, we consider rigidification acting towards things that are evident or towards things that are normally evident. Then, we might see how dreadfully hidden the standard cases are.

For instance, I have never seen anybody consider the case:

(1) Yellow's color is yellow.

The color of yellow is, naturally, yellow. Hence, when we rigidify on the unique description of the color of yellow, we get to yellow again. Sentence (1)

-----•-----

24. On Niobium

-----•-----

1. Moving to Any Old Set, Not an “Object” Set

The other day I found myself in the basement, and, not for the first time, I experienced an intensely strong feeling that I had come down there for a reason, that I had come down there to get something. I decided to believe the rectitude of the feeling, since it was not the first time I had such a feeling and since all the other times, if I thought about it long enough, it eventually dawned on me what sort of thing I had come to procure. I sat there and waited. It was an interesting philosophical situation.

Obviously, one could rigidify on the very object I was going to pick up in the basement once I figured out which sort of thing I needed. The notion—that (the thing I am going to clutch once I think this through)—is reasonable and well enough defined. However, the interesting part of the matter is that I have six of everything. For instance, all my socks are short and white. They are basically indistinguishable. I haven’t learned a difference between any of them. Hence, I had clearly come down to procure a *sort* of thing, not a particular thing, at all.

This linguistic maneuver is not part of D that because it devolves to the essence of particular things. But what I wanted to think about was a concept under which a few particular things might fall. I was searching for a concept. Once I had *that*, I could find the object soon enough.

A careful reader might have seen rigidification generally involves motion from one descriptive set, A , on the domain side to another set, B , on the domain side, too, based on some obscure particulars of the world. The operator, D that, goes to the other set, B , by way of particular essences. But it is a very narrow way of transitioning. It is just one way to go from A to B . There is a larger issue—general rigidification—that moves us to the domain-side rigid set without being bound to the narrow realm of essences. It is



25. Final Thoughts



1. Word Games and Random Thoughts

There is a sort of mental activity *you* can assign to people that involves any bit of flotsam and jetsam strewn throughout the universe (upon any grounds you might feel like invoking), and there is a sort of mental activity they can assign to themselves. It is only the latter thoughts that are interesting. The former are called thoughts. Quite trivially. We are hypothesizing the word ‘thought’ exists and that you are assigning flotsam and jetsam (and whatever else you want to) to this word. You are using a black and white word as you wish. You are picking out random relations, too, such being near an upside down teacup a mile from Bangalore or being five feet from a Möbius strip buried in a tulip garden, and, if these relations hold, you say the thought is: *mine*. Or, if these other relations hold, you say the thought is: *Leonard Nimoy’s*. So, these things can be *anything at all*, and you are calling them “thoughts.” Speaking as you speak, they are thoughts. Trivially, your claim is true. They are my thoughts. And Leonard Nimoy’s thoughts. It is your short hand way of saying that these various things are strewn throughout the universe and these various relations hold. It is trivial. Knock yourself out.

Meanwhile, the other thoughts—the ones I am talking about—are being thought by oysters like Jake. He is thinking about a purple wavy line on a yellow background. He is thinking about the smell of meatloaf.

Naturally, you can go on to say that Jake is thinking your thoughts. Your sentence is true when your relations hold. We are talking at cross purposes, now. There is very little point to all this.

And there were various philosophers who, in the seventies and eighties, decided to define “thoughts” in odd and sundry ways. Until this time, there had been “a traditional concern with the individual subject of mental states

References

- Adams, Fred and Laura Dietrich. 2004. What's in a(n Empty) Name? *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Vol. 85, p. 125-48.
- Bach, Kent. 1987. *Thought and Reference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Braun, David. 1993. Empty Names. *Nous*. Vol. 27, p. 449-69.
- Braun, David. 2005. Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. *Nous*. Vol. 39, p. 596-631.
- Burge, Tyler. 1979. Individualism and the Mental. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*. Vol. 4, p. 73-121.
- Carnap, Rudolf. 1928/1967. *The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Carnap, Rudolf. 1947/1956. *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Devitt, Michael. 1981. *Designation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Devitt, Michael and Kim Sterelny. 1987. *Language and Reality*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Donnellan, Keith. 1962. Necessity and Criteria. *Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. 59, p. 647-58.
- Donnellan, Keith. 1966. Reference and Definite Descriptions. *The Philosophical Review*. Vol. 75, p. 281-304.
- Donnellan, Keith. 1970. Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions. *Synthese*. Vol. 21, p. 335-58.
- Donnellan, Keith. 1974. Speaking of Nothing. *Philosophical Review*. Vol. 83, p. 3-31.
- Dowty, David, Robert Wall and Stanley Peters. 1981. *Introduction to Montague Semantics*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.